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A b stract
We show experimentally th a t public goods are provided more efficiently via the vol­
untary contribution mechanism (VCM) if players can divide their contributions into two 
stages. Our findings address the role of leadership in social dilemmas. Do leaders provide 
a "good example "? And how do they affect the behavior of potential followers? We 
find th a t Stage 1 contributions in the sequential two-stage VCM show significant leader­
ship effect. At the same time, the followers’ Stage 2 contributions represent a negligible 
share of the efficiency gain. We conclude th a t an efficient sequencing of contributions in 
the VCM has to be targeted towards creating leadership incentives, and th a t leadership 
should be inclusive rather than  exclusive.
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1 In troduction
In the absence of any enforcement mechanism, standard theory predicts th a t the pres­
ence of positive externalities in the public goods games will result in their underprovision. 
Indeed, although the behavior in the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (VCM) experi­
ments is marked by the absence of full defection at the start of the subjects’ interaction, 
this partial cooperation is found to ebb away over time (Ledyard, 1995, Keser and van 
W inden, 2000, Croson et al., 2005). This pattern  of contributions to the public good can 
be explained by the preference heterogeneity of the subject pool where besides strategi­
cally acting, own-payoff maximizing subjects, also conditionally cooperative (or recipro­
cal) subjects are present in the subject pool (Fischbacher and Gaechter, 2008, Burlando 
and Guala, 2005). The initial contributions can be attribu ted  to these conditional coop­
erators, while the decline over time is result of their reaction to the presence of defectors 
(Andreoni, 1995, B randts and Schram, 2001).
In this paper, we address whether the standard simultaneous-move VCM can be re­
designed with the goal of achieving higher efficiency, when taking into account the role 
conditional cooperation might play. We focus on two aspects of the presence of conditional 
cooperators in the subject pool. First, on the fact th a t conditionally cooperative subjects 
are willing to sacrifice m aterial payoffs in order to increase payoffs of others, provided these 
other subjects also manifested their willingness to sacrifice m aterial payoffs. Second, on 
the fact th a t some subjects might recognize the role of conditional cooperation and choose 
to behave cooperatively due to strategic, rather than  due to intrinsic motivations. We 
refer to the former as the followers’ effect, and to the latter as the leadership effect. To 
summarize briefly, we show in this paper th a t introducing a sequential structure into VCM 
results in a higher efficiency than  the simultaneous VCM, and this in the absence of any 
enforcement mechanisms. In this way, wasteful costs of the enforcement process, whether 
centralized or decentralized, could be saved purely by restructuring the interaction of the 
players. We comment on the extent to which our design is successful in achieving this 
goal. We analyze the role of leadership and followers in generating the efficiency gain, 
and stress the crucial role of inclusive leadership in the efficient VCM design.
The experimental study we present here is related to an extensive literature on the 
role of conditional cooperation in social dilemmas, as well to a less extensive, but not less 
im portant, work on the role of leadership in the social dilemmas.
To start with, there is a vast experimental evidence on the human tendency for con­
ditional cooperation. Around half of the subjects in the seminal paper by Fischbacher, 
Gaechter and Fehr (2001) use conditionally cooperative strategies in the VCM experiment: 
they contribute more to the public good the higher is the average contribution of others 
in their group. This observation has quite a general validity as it has been replicated 
across various geographic pools and experiment designs (see e.g. Bardsley 2000, Keser 
and van W inden, 2000, Herrmann and Thoeni, 2007, Kocher et al. 2007, Fischbacher and 
Gaechter, 2008). Moreover, conditional cooperation is found in the field and shown to 
affect the economic performance of real-world institutions. Any team  production problem 
or charity institutional design might represent an example in point. For example, Shang 
and Croson (2006) find th a t charity donations are sensitive to the feedback on the provi­
sion of the previous donors: potential donors increase (decrease) own contribution when
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they learn th a t another individual contributed more (less) than  the past contribution of 
the respondent. Similarly, Frey and Meier (2004) observe th a t students contribute more 
to a students’ fund when informed th a t a high fraction of others contributed as well, 
rather than  when informed th a t a low fraction of others contributed. In the team  pro­
duction set-up, Knez and Simister (2001) find th a t the ability to monitor other members’ 
behavior leads to a significant efficiency gain among luggage handling team s of an airline 
company, upon being exposed to a group bonus payment scheme, effectively turning the 
team  members into public good providers. And, Ittner et al. (2006) use data on compen­
sation schemes of medical group practices to show th a t they are dependent on variables 
determining the extent of monitoring, allowing for conditional cooperation, and hence for 
team-based rather than  individual-performance based incentive schemes.
In the light of this evidence, conditional cooperation cannot be ignored in addressing 
the efficient provision of public goods. Sugden (1984) shows theoretically th a t in the 
standard VCM design, the interaction of reciprocal (conditionally cooperative) players 
and the expectation of conditional cooperation generates a set of equilibria larger than  the 
point prediction obtained under the assumption of pure money-maximization incentives. 
Efficiency of these equilibria is generally higher than  when conditional cooperators are 
not taken into account. Equilibrium multiplicity of this result, though, has to be taken 
into account when putting conditional cooperation to work in the lab - or in the field. 
In order to coordinate the players’ beliefs, the nature of conditional cooperation calls for 
some sort of sequencing in the players’ moves so th a t both the incentives for conditional 
cooperation, as well as incentives for triggering conditional cooperation by cooperating, 
are created in the new design as compared to the standard VCM, in which all players 
move simultaneously. Importantly, not only conditional cooperators, but also players 
with other preferences, in particular selfish players, need to be incentivized to contribute 
to the public good. Literature provides evidence th a t such incentives could be generated 
in "leader" positions - when players are aware th a t their behavior will be observed before 
others choose their actions in the VCM.
Starting from the original paper by Van der Heijden and Moxnes (2003) studying a 
public bad game, the evidence mounts suggesting th a t the presence of leaders increases 
the efficiency in the social dilemma game, but th a t the efficiency gain is prevalently due 
to the behavior of the leaders, rather than  by the impact the leaders have on the behavior 
of the followers. Followers follow insufficiently any good example given by the leaders, 
and the economic gains of leadership, although of the significant in the mentioned studies, 
are economically rather small, leaving large possible efficiency gains aside. In the similar 
vein, when all players move sequentially, in a randomly assigned order, earlier ranked 
players are found to cooperate more than  the later ranked players: it is the earlier ranked 
players th a t generate the efficiency gain as compared to the simultaneous move structure. 
Masclet and Willinger (2005) observe this effect in a sequential public goods game with a 
feedback on the actions of the earlier ranked players. Funaki and Vyrastekova (2008) find 
similarly th a t cooperation rates decrease in later ranked players in a sequential prisoner’s 
dilemma game.
Finally, evidence from endogenous timing of moves in public goods games also suggests 
th a t the contribution to efficiency gains due to conditional cooperation itself are limited. 
For example, Gueth et al. (2002) and Levati and Neugebauer (2004) show th a t inequali­
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ties resulting from the individual public good contributions diminish, but efficiency does 
not rise, in an ascending/descending English clock auction mechanism, where all players 
observe the actions of all the players tha t choose to move. In a similar setup studied by 
Dorsey (1990) and Kurzban et al. (2001), players can adjust their contributions upwards 
and /or downwards at any time during the game, while continuously informed about the 
behavior of the others. In treatm ents where only increase of the contributions to the 
public good is possible, cooperation is more frequent than  when both the revisions of 
contributions upwards and downwards are possible. Remarkably, several groups in the 
Kurzban et al. (2001) experiment achieved close to full efficiency in a treatm ent where 
only feedback on the lowest current individual contribution was available to the subjects. 
This finding is quite extraordinary, as the authors, simply by adding sequential structure 
and information restriction to the VCM, seem to have activated optimally the incentives 
to cooperate for all players, here endogenously choosing the role of the leader and /or 
follower. We find this observation remarkable as it points towards the role of inclusive 
leadership: by revealing only the lowest most recent contribution, all players expecting 
conditional cooperation have a motivation to improve upon the most recent lowest con­
tribution, in order to avoid the downward spiral of defection. In a work related to the 
incremental nature of cooperation, Andreoni and Samuelson (2006) show theoretically and 
experimentally th a t the cooperation rates in a sequence of two prisoner’s dilemma games 
are highest when the players do not start with too large stakes in the first stage. Starting 
small promotes cooperation, and seems to be an im portant building block of design which 
optimally uses conditional cooperation as an incentive to contribute to a public good.
To summarize the findings discussed above, sequential moves - in whatever specific 
form - promote cooperation in the VCM through generating leadership incentives. The 
efficiency gains from follower’s behavior are less im portant for the overall efficiency gain 
than  the contributions of the leader(s). We propose th a t this mounting evidence towards 
the role of leadership should be taken into account and could be used in designing a 
sequential VCM mechanism activating the leader’s incentives. Consequently, we suggest 
a design in which all players - rather than  only one player - could be incentivized by the 
leadership effect, i.e. by the incentive to contribute to the public good in expectation th a t 
such a good example will be followed. In doing tha t, we address whether the lack of a focal 
leader position in this design with inclusive leadership removes the strategic incentives to 
lead. A simple design th a t could achieve this goal is a design in which players choose in 
two stages how much to contribute to the public good from their initial endowment, and 
they receive a feedback on contributions of others after Stage 1, and before their decision 
in Stage 2. We test the impact of this two-stage structure on the efficiency of the VCM 
experimentally, and analyze the role of the leadership as well as the followers’ contribution 
to the efficiency.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follow. We present our experimental design 
in Section 2, and data analysis can be found in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
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2 T he gam e and experim ent design
We consider a symmetric linear public goods game where player i0s payoff function, i =
1,.., N, is given by
K  =  E  — zi +  « Z  (1)
where E  >  0 is the initial endowment, zi is player i0s contribution to the public good,
N
Z  =  ^2 zi is the group’s to ta l contribution to the public good, and a  2 (1/N , 1) is
i=1
the marginal per capita return from the public good. W hen each player maximizes own 
m onetary payoff, the unique best response for player i is to set zi =  0; resulting in a 
unique Nash equilibrium in which no public good is provided, while the joint payoff of all 
players is maximized when each player i =  1,.., N  sets zi =  E.
We will distinguish two protocols by which players choose their to ta l contribution to 
the public good. In the one-stage VCM, each player i =  1,.., N, chooses own contribution 
to the public good zi G f 0 ,1, . . . ,E g individually and simultaneously with all remaining 
players, and then observes the vector of contributions (zi)N=1. In the two-stage VCM, 
each player i =  1, ... , N  first chooses individually and simultaneously with all remain­
ing players own contribution in Stage 1, x i 2 f0 ,1 ,... ,E g , then observes the contribu­
tions vector (xi)N=1, and then, in Stage 2, chooses own contribution to the public good, 
yi 2 f 0 ,1, . . . ,E  — xig, again individually and simultaneously with all remaining players. 
Thereafter, all players obtain feedback on the contributions vector chosen in the group in 
Stage 2, (yi)N=1. Player i0s to ta l contribution to the public good in the two stages equals to 
zi =  xi +  yi . Note th a t Stage 2 contribution yi of player i is constrained by the endowment 
remaining after Stage 1 contribution, yi <  E  — xi , so th a t the individual contribution to 
the public good has the same range in both  protocols, zi 2 f 0 ,1,..., Eg.
As already noted by Sugden (1984), the Nash equilibrium prediction for both  pro­
tocols might differ from the Nash equilibrium with zero contributions if (some) subjects 
are conditionally cooperative rather than  pure payoff-maximizing individuals. We now, 
further propose, th a t in order to coordinate the subjects’ beliefs, it is actually im portant 
whether the interaction takes place in the one-stage or in the two-stage protocol. The two- 
stage protocol allows for leadership effect: it generates strategic incentives to contribute 
in Stage 1 in order to motivate conditionally cooperative subjects to contribute in Stage
2. Such incentives are absent in the one-stage protocol. In other words, we suggest th a t 
more cooperation will be found in the two-stage than  in the one-stage protocol because 
conditionally cooperative individuals but also strategically acting individuals obtain in­
centives to contribute a part of their endowment in Stage 1 (leadership effect), so th a t 
conditional cooperation is triggered in Stage 2 (followers ’effect).
H ypothesis: (H0) Subjects form beliefs about the presence of conditional cooperators in 
the same way in both protocols, and coordinate on the same equilibrium, given their 
beliefs in one-stage and two-stage VCM. The efficiency of the public good provision 
is the same in both these protocols. (HA) Subjects form beliefs - and expect th a t 
other form believes - about the presence of conditional cooperators based on the 
behavior observed in Stage 1. Therefore, the two-stage protocol creates strategic
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incentives to contribute in Stage 1 some part of the endowment even for subjects who 
themselves are not conditionally cooperative. Consequently, the sequential protocol 
of the two-stage VCM results in higher efficiency th a t the simultaneous protocol of 
the one-stage VCM.
In the text below, we test our hypothesis using the data from experiments conducted 
at University of Liverpool, Management School, in year 2006 and 2007. The subjects were 
140 students of business, economics and finance programs, who participated in cca 1,5 
hour lasting experimental session. The language of the experiment was English, and it was 
computerized, programmed and conducted using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2001). Upon arrival 
at a session, participants were randomly seated at computers. No communication other 
than  subm itting contributions in the public goods game via the programmed software 
was allowed. Subjects were paid for their decisions.1 Before making paid decisions, 
subjects provided answers to a few test questions on the understanding of the experiment 
instructions, which were distributed on paper to the participants and read aloud by the 
experimenter.
Subjects participated in 12 rounds of a public goods game with the payoff function 
given by equation 1, where we set E  =  15, N  =  4 and a  =  0.4. Subject’s payoffs in 
both treatm ents were presented by the formula as well as by a payoff table, see Appendix
1 and Table 5. In the experiments, we used anonymous Partner matching2, and in the 
control treatm ent (T1-partner treatm ent), we implemented the one-stage public goods 
game, while in the main treatm ent (T2-partner treatm ent), we implemented the two- 
stage public goods game.3 Additionally, we also used stranger matching in the two-stage 
game (T2-stranger treatm ent) in order to study the impact of repeated interactions on the 
two-stage VCM, see Table 1. In the standard simultaneous VCM, contributions usually 
decline faster under the strangers matching than  under the partners matching (Keser and 
van Winden, 2005). This difference is expected to be less prominent in the two-stage 
VCM (treatm ent T2) if Stage 1 contributions are used as incentives to motivate Stage 2 
contributions by conditional cooperators.
1In all experim ental sessions reported  in th is paper, subjects partic ipated  in two tasks. D ata  from 
Task 1 corresponds to  th e  d a ta  we report in th is  paper. Task 2 was an  unrelated  experim ent.
Note th a t  instructions to  each task  were d istribu ted  only prior to  the  task  and  there  were no interde­
pendencies in paym ents or otherwise between the  two tasks. Subjects were informed th a t  th ey  participate 
in two separate tasks, th a t  the  tasks are fully independent, and  th ey  received earnings feedbacks a t the 
end of each task. We therefore can focus in th is paper th e  behavior of the  first ta sk  in isolation of the 
second task.
2 We applied so called anonym ous P artn ers  m atching, where the  group com positions stays the  same 
in all periods, b u t sub jec ts’ random ly assigned labels (ranging from 1 to  4) change in each round. The 
advantage of th is  design is th a t  players cannot track  individual histories over tim e, and hence the ir 
strategies can only condition obtained on the  inform ation in the  current round, and on the  commonly 
known history  of the  play.
3All subjects received the  same instructions differing only in a few sentences describing the  trea tm en t: 
i.e. contribution to  the  public good to  be done in one stage; or in two stages, w ith a feedback between 
them .
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Treatm ent P artic ipan ts (groups)
Control: T l-p a rtn e r 28 (7)
Main: T 2-partner 64 (16)
T2-stranger 48 (12)
Table 1: List of all sessions.
»  Two-stage Strangers 
—□ — Two-stage Partners 
- a -  -  One-stage Partners
Period
Figure 1: Average group contributions by treatm ent and period.
3 D ata  analysis
Figure 1 shows the average group contributions to the public good in the one-stage VCM 
(T1) and two-stage VCM (T2) over time. Splitting the VCM contributions into two 
stages leads to a significant increase in the to ta l public good provided as compared to 
the standard one stage VCM (unit of observation is the average group contribution over 
12 rounds in T1-partner vs. T2-partner treatm ent, M ann-W hitney U-test, N=7+16, 
p=0.008). We also find th a t the average group contributions in the two-stage T2 treatm ent 
do not differ in the two matching protocols (unit of observation is the average group 
contribution in T2-partner vs. T2-stranger, M ann-W hitney U-test, N=12+16, p=0.767).
O bservation  1: Contributions to the public good are higher when subjects choose them  
sequentially in two stages. The contributions in the two-stage T2 treatm ents are 
independent of the matching protocol (partners or strangers).
Based on this observation, we reject our null hypothesis in favor of the alternative 
hypothesis. The two-stage VCM structure does affect the efficiency of the public good 
provision. Similarly as in the numerous other leadership studies we surveyed in this paper, 
this efficiency gain is economically far from overwhelming.4 Nevertheless, the contribu­
tions are significantly higher than  in the standard one-stage VCM, and this without any
4T he average group contributions are 11.7 vs. 4.0 in T 2-partner and  in T 1-partner, respectively. Recall 
th a t  the  social optim um  is 60, while the  Nash equilibrium  prediction is 0.
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(i) Stage 1 contributions (x) in T2 and overall contributions in T 1 (ii) S ta g e 2 c o n tr ib u tio n s (y ) in T 2
i s
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Figure 2: Contributions to the public good by stage: (i) Stage 1 in T2 and T1, (ii) Stage
2 in T2.
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additional enforcement mechanism whatsoever. In th a t sense, it is relevant to identify 
the source of the efficiency gain, to be able to bank on it in mechanism design. Let us 
discuss where the efficiency gain obtained in T2 as compared to T1 (partner matching) 
comes from. Can the efficiency gain be a ttributed  to the leadership in Stage 1, or can we 
mark it as due to the conditional cooperation of the followers in Stage 2?
For one, we find a significant leadership effect in Stage 1 behavior: players in Stage 1 of 
treatm ent T2 contribute more because Stage 2 is present. The most persuasive evidence 
on the leadership effect is th a t groups in Stage 1 of treatm ent T2 contribute twice as 
much as they do overall in treatm ent T1, and this difference is significant (7.7 vs. 4.0, 
MWU p =  0.033, N =16+7). In this respect, both Stranger and Partner treatm ent in T2 
show the same role of leadership incentives, as the Stage 1 contributions in both matching 
designs are statistically not different from each other (MWU, N=12+16, p =  0.802).
W hen looking at the individual contributions in both stages, see Figure 2, zero contri­
bution is the most frequent choice in both stages. However, this choice was made in 52% 
of all cases in T2-partners treatm ent and in 65% of all cases in T2-strangers treatm ent, 
while zero contributions to the public good in the T1-partner treatm ent was made in 84% 
of all cases. We propose th a t the difference between the frequency of zero contributions 
in treatm ent T1 and T2 is due to the leadership effect, i.e. due to contributions th a t 
are strategic, and boost Stage 1 contributions to the public good.. In order to identify 
this effect, we focus on individual choices where subject i contributed strictly positive 
amount in Stage 1, x  >  0, but chooses zero contribution in Stage 2, (y  =  0), see Figure
3. About one quarter of the contribution choices (26% T2 partners treatm ent and 21% 
and T2 strangers treatm ent) show this pattern, and might be related to strategic lead­
ership and a direct result of the sequential structure of the two-stage VCM. Note th a t 
by focusing on zero Stage 2 contributions, we exclude from consideration the impact of 
conditional cooperators "starting small ", as these would choose to contribute a strictly 
positive amount not only in Stage 1 ( x  >  0), but also in Stage 2 (y  >  0). This is, how-
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Figure 3: Individual choices in the two stages of T2.
ever, only partially true, as Stage 2 zero contributions might be conditional or negative 
reciprocal responses to situations where a pro-socially oriented player contributes in Stage 
1, but then observes Stage 1 contributions of other players th a t trigger negative response 
in Stage 2, and hence zero contribution in Stage 2. To exclude such circumstances, we can 
focus our attention even more, and consider only situations where a negative reciprocal 
motivation is absent for a subject. These would be the cases where subject i contributed 
a strictly positive amount in Stage 1 x  >  0, but h is/her contribution was lower than  
the average contribution of the remaining three members of their group, x  <  |
reciprocal (or conditionally cooperative) subject will not choose y  =  0 in this case, while 
a subject who made his/her positive contributions in Stage 1 only due to strategic motives 
will choose y  =  0. Excluding the confounding of reciprocal and strategic behavior, we 
observe th a t about half of strictly positive Stage 1 contributions followed by zero Stage 2 
contributions (in the absence of negative reciprocal motives) can be identified as strategic 
leadership contributions (the number of observations is 27/44 in T2 strangers treatm ent 
and 60/115 in T2 partners treatm ent, i.e. 61% and 52%, respectively). This gives us 
additional, individual behavior evidence, tha t leadership effect impacts on the two-stage 
VCM. To summarize,
O bservation  2: We find significant leadership effect in the two-stage VCM, where sub­
jects contribute to the public good in Stage 1 because of the presence of Stage 
2.
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-T2 strangers 
T2 partners
xi -(x-i)/(N-1)
Figure 4: The percentage of the endowment remainder after Stage 1 contributed by 
subject i in Stage 2, as a function of i’s Stage 1 constribution relative to the average Stage 
1 contribution of the other three subjects.
Having identified leadership behavior in our experimental design, we now proceed to 
quantify its impact on conditional cooperation, i.e. we focus on contributions in Stage 2 
of the game. In order to identify the followers’ effect in our experiment, Figure 4 presents 
the share of the endowment contributed to the public good in Stage 2 by subject i from 
the endowment remaining after Stage 1, Eyx , depending on the comparison of the subject 
i ’s Stage 1 contribution, x*, to the average Stage 1 contribution of the remaining three 
players, — . If Stage 1 contributions trigger Stage 2 contributions - i.e. followers ’effect 
- we expect th a t when i0s contribution in Stage 1 is lower than  the average of the three 
remaining players (x* — < 0), i will contribute relatively high share of its remaining 
endowment in Stage 2, Ey_^x ; and when i0s contribution in Stage 1 is higher than  the
average of the three remaining players (x* — — > 0), i will contribute relatively low 
share of its remaining endowment in Stage 2, Eyx . We find exactly the opposite. Rather 
than  players contributing less than  others on average, we find th a t players contributing 
more than  others on average are those who contribute a higher nonzero share of own 
remaining endowment to the public good in Stage 2. The followers’ effect is in any case 
not strong enough to trigger Stage 2 contributions by the subjects at the lower range of 
the Stage 1 contributions in their group.
O bservation  3: The followers’ effect, if any, is too weak in order to result in Stage 2 
contributions responding conditionally cooperatively to the Stage 1 contributions.
So, while we find evidence of significant leadership effect even in our inclusive leader­
ship design without focal leader position, we, similar to other leadership papers, fail to 
find significant followers’ effect. Note th a t this discrepancy between beliefs likely to be
11
held by the players in the leadership positions, and the actual lack of conditional cooper­
ation in the followers positions, results in unfulfilled expectations by the strategic leaders, 
and might call, over time, for adjustm ent of the beliefs of the subjects taking upon the 
strategic leadership. Consequently, one can expect the declining pattern  of cooperation 
due to the leadership effect, as seems to be taking place in our experiments as well (see 
Figure 1, and Clark and Sefton, 2001, for a discussion of this question in the context 
of two-player prisoner’s dilemma game). One has to, therefore, further investigate how 
the leadership incentives could be preserved over time. Our future research will therefore 
address this question by studying information structures under which the behavior of 
conditional cooperators is steered away from the unravelling of cooperation, while at the 
same time, the incentives for the strategic leaders are supported. Recalling the work by 
Kurzban et al. (2001), there is some evidence th a t the type of information feedback the 
subjects receive affects im portantly the evolution of the contributions in the VCM with 
sequential structure. In particular, when the feedback is such th a t subjects are informed 
after Stage 1 only about the lowest Stage 1 contribution, the incentives for the strategic 
leadership are strengthened, as every pure-payoff maximizing subject in the presence of 
conditional cooperators could have an incentive to increase the contribution level feed- 
backed to the conditional cooperators. At the same time, when the feedback after Stage 
1 announces only the highest Stage 1 contribution, the incentives to lead could result in 
a coordination game among the strategic leaders, which would want to "hide" their low 
contributions behind a high contribution of another leader player. In this way, restricting 
the information feedback is either in favor of strengthening the cooperation incentives by 
the followers, or by the leaders, and it is open to an experimental test which of these 
two information designs leads to a higher efficiency. Note also, th a t these complementary 
information feedback designs might have natural counterparts in the real-world social 
dilemma situations, and hence serve as an explanatory variable for the performance of 
the leadership structures in various social dilemmas.5
4 C onclusions
Introducing sequential moves into the voluntary contribution mechanism increases effi­
ciency of the public good provision. As we surveyed in the introduction, several authors 
showed this effect in various experimental designs either with one focal leader, or with 
all players moving in a sequence, and found th a t it can be attribu ted  to the "leading 
"positions in the game. Contributions of the followers contribute to the efficiency gains 
only marginally. Moreover, although leadership increases significantly the public good 
provision, the actual economic gain from pure leadership, absent enforcement or other
5To give an  example, a situa tion  in which one volunteer is sufficient to  take upon organizing a charity 
would be case of the  "highest contribution" feedback. In th is case, even if every individual contribution  
to  the  charity  improves the  public good provided, the  individual w ith the  highest contribution is the 
one organizing th e  charity, and  thus visible to  th e  others. O n the  o ther hand, an  example of the  lowest 
contribution feedback could be a group ta sk  th a t  involves each group m em ber cleaning up a p a rt of 
the  com m unal space from fallen leaves. As the  leaves can easily spread from one place to  another, the 
person leaving the  highest am ount of th e  leaves behind, i.e. contributing least to  the  public good, would 
determ ine the  overall perception of how clean the  com m unal spaces are left after the  cleaning.
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incentives, is not overwhelming. Nevertheless, it arises systematically, and across various 
experimental designs, and hence merits attention. Can we design a voluntary contribution 
mechanism with a higher efficiency simply by creating leadership position in the game? 
This question is relevant, as restructuring the players ’interaction does not carry any costs, 
unlike invasive enforcement mechanisms, like sanctioning.
Given th a t subjects often choose to lead in experiments with one explicitly assigned 
(or self-selected) leader player, we propose and run an experiment where no player is 
excluded from adopting "leadership" incentives. In the interest of capturing as many 
efficiency gains from leadership as possible, we sequence the contribution to the public 
good in the VCM into two stages, and in each stage, all players move simultaneously. In 
Stage 1, any player can then consider h is/her position to be th a t one of "a leader", i.e. of 
a player who might be followed. Note th a t a player does not have to hold other-regarding 
preferences him /herself in order to contribute in the "leader " position: it is sufficient if 
he/she believes th a t others will follow the good example set by him/herself. Additionally, 
the two-stage design also decreases risk for those conditionally cooperative players who 
are rather pessimistic about the cooperation of others in their group: by moving in two 
stages, they can "start small" their cooperative behavior. The question remains whether 
in this type of design, without any focal selected/self-selected or assigned "leader", players 
would perceive the situation as one where strategic incentives to lead arise. Does inclusive 
leadership take place?
Based on our experiments, we find th a t subjects often choose to lead even in the 
absence of focal leadership positions: Stage 1 contributions in the two-stage VCM exceed 
the overall contributions of the one-stage VCM. However, like other authors, we also find 
th a t leadership is not followed sufficiently. Players in our experiments contribute very 
little of their remaining endowment in the second stage of the mechanism and do not 
match the leaders’ good example. Briefly, we find the two-stage VCM with inclusive 
leadership structure to result in higher efficiency th a t the one-stage VCM, and this due 
to the "leadership " effect; we find no evidence for the followers’ effect.
We conclude th a t incentives to lead others should not be underestim ated when design­
ing mechanisms for voluntary public good provision. In particular, we should be aware 
th a t a large share of the efficiency gain from leadership - is due to the leading itself - due 
the ability to inform others about own contribution to the public good before incremental 
contributions to the public good could be made - and hence, leadership should be inclu­
sive rather than  exclusive. Future research will be devoted to the question whether the 
information feedback affects the efficiency gains even further. In the current design, play­
ers are informed about the complete contribution vector of Stage 1 contributions before 
they make their decisions in Stage 2. In this way, coordination problems might lead to 
the unravelling of cooperation. We plan to study two modifications of our design, one in 
which only feedback on the lowest contribution Stage 1 is available, and one in which only 
information on the highest contribution in Stage 1 is available. We hypothesize tha t the 
former will further strengthen the leadership effect, while the la tter might have negative 
impact on the overall efficiency gains due to the ability of the strategic players to "hide" 
their low contributions. Importantly, VCM design using sequential move structure and 
information feedback is absent any socially wasteful costs, and hence could be seen as 
an efficient counterpart to the peer sanctioning mechanisms which achieve high rates of
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cooperation in the social dilemmas, albeit at a cost. Further research will show how far 
the efficiency gains from this non-evasive mechanism type can be pushed in direction of 
the full efficiency.
5 A p p en d ix  1: Instructions for th e  participants
In troduction
You will now partic ipate  in an experim ent on economic decision-m aking. The experim ent will last 
approxim ately 1.5 hours. You will be paid  individually after th e  experim ent 3 pounds partic ipation  fee 
PLUS any additional earnings you will make in the  experim ent. How much you earn crucially depends 
on your decisions in th e  experim ent. D uring the  whole experim ent, you are not allowed to  ta lk  to  other 
participants. Disobeying th is rule will result in your exclusion from the  experim ent. In the  experim ent, 
you will partic ipa te  in two Tasks. You will earn  points in each of them . At th e  end of the  experim ent, 
you will be paid  for all the  points you earned. The exchange ra te  is: 100 point =  1.5 pounds.
Task 1:
This ta sk  has 12 rounds. In each round, you will be in a group w ith th ree o ther participants; a group 
therefore consists of four partic ipants in to ta l. Note th a t  you will be m atched into a group w ith the  same 
th ree partic ipants in each round of Task 1. However, each of the  th ree subjects in your group will be 
assigned a different nam e in each round. Inform ation abou t yourself will be given to  you on the  com puter 
screens under the  label “Me” . Inform ation abou t the  o ther th ree subjects will be given to  you under 
the  labels “O ther subject (1)” , “O ther subject (2)” and  “O ther subject (3)” . Keep in m ind th a t  names 
change over periods (e.g. “O ther subject (1)” in one round is not the  same person as “O ther subject (1)” 
in ano ther round).
Earnings
In every round, you receive 15 tokens and  can decide to  use any num ber of them  in a jo in t project. If 
you choose to  pu t x tokens in the  jo in t project and  th e  sum  of tokens chosen by th e  o ther th ree subjects 
in your group equals Y, th en  your payoff is equal to  Payoff =  15 - x  +  0.4*(x +  Y). T h a t m eans choosing 
x tokens (i.e. x is your action) decreases your payoff by x, and  increases your payoff by 0.4 tim es x. At 
the  same tim e, it increases the  payoff of everyone else by 0.4 tim es x. W hen m aking your decisions, you 
can use the  above formula, bu t you can also make use of the  Payoff Table below. This Table contains 
the  num ber of points you can earn for different com binations of the  num ber of tokens ‘x ’ you can choose 
and  th e  sum of num ber of tokens Y of the  o ther subjects th a t  is a result of the ir own individual choices. 
Please, have a look a t the  Payoff Table (Figure 5) now.
In the  first column (in grey), you find all possible actions ‘x ’ you may choose, th a t  is num ber of tokens 
you pu t into the  jo in t project 0,1, .. ., 14,15. In the  first row (in grey), you find some of th e  possible sums 
of all actions chosen by other th ree subjects. Your payoff in points can be found for each com bination of 
‘x ’ and  ‘Y ’ in the  Payoff Table.
Exam ple: Suppose you choose 4 tokens. In th e  grey column, find the  row th a t  begins w ith 4. And, 
suppose the  o ther th ree subjects choose actions th a t gives a sum of 12. In the  grey row, find th e  column 
th a t  begins w ith 12. Look in th e  Table for the  intersection of the  row sta rtin g  w ith 4 and  the  column 
sta rtin g  w ith 12. You find th a t  your earnings in points for th a t  case would be 17.4 points. Observe: the 
num ber of points you earn, depends crucially on the  choices of the  o ther th ree subjects. If, for example, 
you choose 2 tokens for th e  jo in t project and if the  o ther group sub jec ts’ choice gives a sum  of 0, you 
earn 13.8 points, however, if the  o ther group sub jec ts’ choice gives a sum of 45 then  you earn  31.8 point.
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T he sum  of actions of th e  o ther th ree  group subjects (Y)
| 
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|
0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 33 36 39 42 45
15 16.2 17.4 18.6 19.8 21 22.2 23.4 24.6 25.8 27 28.2 29.4 30.6 31.8 33
14.4 15.6 16.8 18 19.2 20.4 21.6 22.8 24 25.2 26.4 27.6 28.8 30 31.2 32.4
2 13.8 15 16.2 17.4 18.6 19.8 21 22.2 23.4 24.6 25.8 27 28.2 29.4 30.6 31.8
13.2 14.4 15.6 16.8 18 19.2 20.4 21.6 22.8 24 25.2 26.4 27.6 28.8 30 31.2
4 12.6 13.8 15 16.2 17.4 18.6 19.8 21 22.2 23.4 24.6 25.8 27 28.2 29.4 30.6
12 13.2 14.4 15.6 16.8 18 19.2 20.4 21.6 22.8 24 25.2 26.4 27.6 28.8 30
11.4 12.6 13.8 15 16.2 17.4 18.6 19.8 21 22.2 23.4 24.6 25.8 27 28.2 29.4
7 10.8 12 13.2 14.4 15.6 16.8 18 19.2 20.4 21.6 22.8 24 25.2 26.4 27.6 28.8
10.2 11.4 12.6 13.8 15 16.2 17.4 18.6 19.8 21 22.2 23.4 24.6 25.8 27 28.2
9.6 10.8 12 13.2 14.4 15.6 16.8 18 19.2 20.4 21.6 22.8 24 25.2 26.4 27.6
10 9 10.2 11.4 12.6 13.8 15 16.2 17.4 18.6 19.8 21 22.2 23.4 24.6 25.8 27
11 8.4 9.6 10.8 12 13.2 14.4 15.6 16.8 18 19.2 20.4 21.6 22.8 24 25.2 26.4
12 7.8 9 10.2 11.4 12.6 13.8 15 16.2 17.4 18.6 19.8 21 22.2 23.4 24.6 25.8
13 7.2 8.4 9.6 10.8 12 13.2 14.4 15.6 16.8 18 19.2 20.4 21.6 22.8 24 25.2
14 6.6 7.8 9 10.2 11.4 12.6 13.8 15 16.2 17.4 18.6 19.8 21 22.2 23.4 24.6
15 6 7.2 8.4 9.6 10.8 12 13.2 14.4 15.6 16.8 18 19.2 20.4 21.6 22.8 24
Figure 5: Payoff table.
O ther group subjects affect how m any points you earn, and you affect how m any points they  earn.
Two stages of one round
Each round has two stages and  these are as follows. In stage 1, you and  the  o ther th ree subjects 
in your group sim ultaneously choose how m any of th e  15 tokens (0, 1, . . . ,  14, 15) you pu t into the 
jo in t project. After everyone makes th is  choice, you and  the  o ther subjects receive inform ation about 
the  actions of all subjects in your group. In Stage 2, you again decide how m any of the  15 tokens th a t 
you did not yet pu t into jo in t project you w ant to  pu t into the  same project in Stage 2. After everyone 
makes th is choice, you and  the  o ther subjects receive inform ation abou t the  actions of all subjects in your 
group. The sum of tokens in Stage 1 and Stage 2 is your action x. The sum of o ther sub jec ts’ actions 
in Stage 1 and  Stage 2 is the ir sum of actions Y. Your payoff is th en  determ ined according to  the  Payoff 
function and Table discussed before. We will now explain how the  com puter screens look.
SCREEN  1 (see figure 6).
Here you decide your action in Stage 1, th a t is how m any tokens you pu t in the  jo in t project in Stage
1. Use the  keyboard to  type  in one of the  num bers 0, 1, . .. 14, 15 and  confirm your choice by pressing OK. 
W arning: Before pressing OK, make sure your choice is correct. You cannot change your decision after 
you have pressed OK. After having pressed OK, you will be asked to  wait until all experim ent participants 
have done the  same. The experim ent continues only after all experim ent partic ipan ts pressed OK. We 
therefore ask you kindly not to  delay your decision too  much. For every decision, a tim e indication of 
one m inute is shown in the  header. After th is tim e expires, you are repeatedly  asked to  subm it your 
decision, or press the  OK bu tton . After pressing OK, a waiting screen will appear. After all experim ent 
p artic ipan ts have pressed OK, Screen 2 will appear.
SCREEN  2 (see figure 7).
In the  upper p a rt of th is screen you find a tab le  w ith inform ation on the  num ber of tokens chosen for 
the  jo in t project in Stage 1 of th is  round by each subject in your group. In th e  lower p a rt of the  screen, 
you decide how m any tokens th a t  you still have left after Stage 1 you w ant to  pu t in the  jo in t project 
in Stage 2. Use the  keyboard to  type in one of the  num bers 0, 1, . . . ,  14, 15 (if possible), and confirm 
your choice by pressing OK. Rem em ber your actions in Stage 1 and  Stage 2 together cannot exceed 15.
15
Figure 6: Screen 1.
W arning: Before pressing OK, make sure your choice is correct. You cannot change your decision after 
you have pressed OK. After having pressed OK, you will be asked to  wait until all experim ent participants 
have done the  same. The experim ent continues only after all partic ipants have pressed OK. We therefore 
ask you kindly not to  delay your decision too  much. For every decision, a tim e indication of one m inute 
is shown in the  header. After th is tim e expires, you are repeatedly asked to  subm it your decision, th a t  is 
press the  OK bu tton . After pressing OK, a waiting screen will appear. A fter all experim ent participants 
have pressed OK, Screen 3 will appear.
SCREEN  3.
In th is screen, you learn all decisions m ade in stage 1 and stage 2 as well as the  num ber of points 
earned in th is round by each of the  subjects in your group. Please, raise your hand  if you have questions 
a t th is m om ent. The experim ent now s ta rts  w ith a short te s t to  make sure th a t  everybody understands 
how points are earned. Use your Payoff Table to  answer the  following questions. After all experim ent par­
tic ipants answered all questions correctly, we will run  2 UNPAID tria l rounds which have no consequence 
for your earnings. Use them  to  learn abou t th e  com puter screens.
Test Questions:
1. If you use 3 tokens for the  jo in t project and the  o ther th ree subjects use 10 tokens each, w hat is 
the  num ber of points you earn?
2. If you use 12 tokens in to ta l for the  jo in t project and the  o ther th ree subjects use a to ta l of 6 
tokens, w hat is the  num ber of points you earn?
3. I will be in the  group w ith the  same th ree o ther partic ipants over all 12 rounds of Task 2. Y E S/N O
4. In all rounds, the  inform ation under the  nam e “O ther subject (1)” on my screen is inform ation 
abou t the  same person. Y E S/N O
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1 out of 2 Remaining time [sec]: 23
Actions in Staye 1
Subject me Other subject 
(1)
Other subject 
(2)
Other subject
(3)
Action in Staye 1
Stage 2
After Stage 1, you tokens, therefore your action in Stage 2canbeany number between 0 and|
Please choose here your action in Staye 2:
Figure 7: Screen 2.
5. The inform ation in the  following figure in the  fields th a t  are circled is abou t the  same person.
Y E S/N O
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Figure 9: Total group contribution per period and treatm ent.
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